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The relevance of equal splits   On a behavioral
discontinuity in ultimatum games




The  ndings on the ultimatum game are considered as belonging to the
most robust experimental results In this paper we present a slightly altered
version of the mini ultimatumgame of Bolton and Zwick  Whereas in
the latter exactly equal splits were feasible in our games these were replaced
by nearly equal splits favoring slightly the proposer in one version and
the responder in a second version Such a minor change should not matter
if behavior was robust We found however a behavioral discontinuity in
the sense that fair oers occur less often when equal splits are replaced by
nearly equal splits This has implications for theories incorporating fairness
into economics
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  Introduction
The  ndings on the ultimatum game see Roth  for a survey are considered
as belonging to the most robust experimental results Bolton and Zwick 
for example have shown that essential behavioral regularities like responders
willingness to reject unfair o	ers and proposers propensity to o	er equal splits
pertain in ultimatum games in which only two o	ers a fair one and a unfair one
are feasible Here we investigate such 
mini ultimatum games in which the 
fair
o	er can be slightly unfair If behavior was robust such small payo	 changes
should not matter But in fact they do Replacing the equal split by a 
nearly
equal split dramatically changes behavior In particular the fair outcome is
chosen less frequently
To be more speci c we investigated three mini ultimatum games one in the
fashion of Bolton and Zwick and two others in which we replaced the equal split by
o	ers once slightly favoring the proposer and once slightly favoring the responder
Moreover we implemented a  by  factorial design concerning the methods of
eliciting behavior
The natural way of implementing a game with sequential moves is of course
to let subjects play it sequentially Then however some information sets may
be seldomly reached what makes it dicult to get a sucient database To
economize on subjects many experimenters apply the socalled strategy method
by simultaneously asking all players for decisions at every information set This
procedure can also reveal more information about the true motivations of a single
subject But there is a caveat Roth   who provides a discussion
of the pros and cons of the strategy method writes The obvious disadvantage is
that it the strategy method removes from experimental observation the possible
e	ects of the timing of decisions in the course of the game  Furthermore
he points out that the strategy method forces subjects to think about each
information set in a di	erent way than if they could primarily concentrate on
those information sets that arise in the course of the game He concludes that
applying the strategy method amounts to a signi cant change in the game itself
and argues that there is some need to explore for which kinds of games there
may be signi cant di	erences in observed behavior when the strategy method is
used
A similar problem arises when subjects participate not only in one game but
in many games Relying on a full a by factorial design sequential play versus
strategy method and one versus many games we studied the games at hand and
found a clearcut result Only the natural design in which subjects play one
 Evidence for the relevance of the timing of decisions is provided by Rapoport 

game sequentially reveals the behavioral relevance of exactly equal splits All
other designs which economize on subjects fail to produce the same behavioral
pattern
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows In Section  we intro
duce the experimental design in more detail In Section  we present the main
behavioral regularities and Section  concludes
 Experimental design































































































































































































































































Figure  The three games
First player A chooses between l and r and then depending on As choice
player B chooses between L  and R  respectively between L and R The three
games only di	er in the payo	s for the path r  L For the variant corresponding
to Bolton and Zwick  this path assigns equal payo	s to both players We
refer to this game as Equal In game Prop player A the proposer receives 
and player B the responder gets  in case of r  L  whereas for game Resp this













































Table  The by factorial design of eliciting choices and the numbers of
subjects participating in the four treatments
is reversed We will refer to the games Prop and Resp also as the 
inequality
games in contrast to the 
equality game
In game Prop both o	ers if accepted imply a payo	 advantage for player A
the proposer whereas in game Resp the proposer can either make an unfair o	er
or one which slightly favors the responder Only in game Equal the proposers
choice is one between o	ering an unfair allocation or o	ering strict equality If
players are only guided by monetary incentives the solution of all three games
is of course the unique subgame perfect equilibrium s   l  L   L
Concerning the method of eliciting choices we distinguish between sequential
and simultaneous play reecting the di	erence between the extensive form game
of Figure  and the corresponding normal form game and we distinguish be
tween a betweensubjects design in which each subject plays only one game and a
withinsubjects design in which each subject plays all three games Both aspects
together establish the by design shown in Table  Table  also indicates
the numbers of subjects who participated in the four treatments
The translated instructions for all four variants which introduce the game
graphically as in Figure  can be found in the Appendix All participants were
undergraduates in economics without training in game theory but some basic
knowledge of neoclassic theory We neither provided any training before the
experiment nor did we repeat the experiment since we are mainly interested in
whether small amounts of inequality can change the usually very robust  rst
round behavior in ultimatum games
 Results
We  rst present the results of treatment Seqone in which subjects sequentially
played one game This is the most natural implementation of the given extensive
form games Behavioral patterns observed in this treatment should be seen as
genuine for the games and should serve as a benchmark for the other treatments




l r L  R  L R
Prop     
Equal      
Resp     
Table  Behavior in treatment Seqone
The  rst observation which is immediately falling upon is that subjects reacted
to the small payo	 changes in a quite dramatic fashion Replacing the equal split
by a nearly equal split makes an important di	erence This can be statistically
validated Proposers choose signi cantly less often the 
fair o	er r when the equal
split is replaced Comparing their behavior in both inequality games with their
decisions in the equality game shows that the patterns are signi cantly di	erent
with p  	   
 Moreover it can be seen that proposers react stronger if
the equal split is replaced by a nearly equal split favoring the responder Whereas
in game Equal two thirds of the proposers choose the fair o	er only one quarter
does the same in game Resp what is signi cant with p      	 
Responder behavior is more dicult to summarize Virtually all responders
accept of course the fair o	er r ie they choose L when being asked More
interesting is how responders react to the unfair o	er Due to sequential play the
number of observations here is much smaller than it has been for the proposers
Nevertheless one can see that the rate of rejections is considerably lower in game
Prop than in the other two games This di	erence is also statistically valid
p     	
We sum up our observations by formulating two behavioral regularities
Regularity   Proposers choose more often the unfair o er when the equal split
is replaced by a nearly equal split This e ect is particularly strong when the
nearly equal split favors the responder
Regularity  Responders reject unfair o ers less often when all agreements
imply a payo  advantage for the proposer
As argued in the introduction the two inequality games are generated by
slightly altering a single payo	 vector of the equality game Our results show
that behavior is not robust with respect to these small changes How can this be
explained Looking at the two inequality games separately we get some clues The
data of game Resp seems to indicate that envy may play an important role and

may overcompensate a general fairness concern proposers may simply hate the
idea of receiving less than their opponent In contrast in game Prop proposers
may have felt especially strong since all allocations implied an advantage for them
If proposers expected responders to share this view and if someone feeling weak
is more likely to accept unfair o	ers ie if proposers anticipated Regularity 
it makes perfect sense for them to be less afraid of rejections and to choose the
greedy o	er
Normative theories are capable of incorporating such e	ects There are at
tempts to use utility functions that depend both on absolute and relative payo	s
see Bolton  and Bolton and Ockenfels  What our results suggest
is that if we  x the absolute payo	 the changes in utility with regard to relative
payo	 are dramatic in the neighborhood of the exactly equal split Utility should
sharply increase at the left of the equal split and steeply decline at the right of
the equal split
Alternatively one could explain our observations by a discontinuity in per
ception and behavior of individuals It might be that fairness considerations are
only triggered if an equal split is feasible Splitting equally plays an important
role in our upbringing Typically our  rst bargaining experiences with siblings
and friends are situations where sharing equally is quite common often enforced
by third parties like parents or teachers
Next we turn to the methodological question whether one can obtain the
same behavioral patterns by either gathering more data andor economizing on
subjects with the strategymethod Tables  and  summarize the observations
obtained from all  subjects who participated in the four treatments The
results are devastating Tables  and  show that the patterns obtained in
SeqOne vanish completely in all other treatments In fact there are virtually no
di	erences between the three games in each of the other three treatments Since
this is true for both players we conclude by
Regularity  Whereas there are signicant di erences in behavior across games
when only one game is played sequentially these di erences do not exist in all other
modes of eliciting choices
Although all treatments other than SeqOne level o	 the di	erences between
the three games they do it in di	erent ways Two e	ects seem worthwhile men
tioning On the one hand proposers choose more often the fair o	er when decid
ing in all games than when deciding only in a single game On the other hand
responders reveal a higher willingness to reject unfair o	ers when the games are
played sequentially as compared to simultaneous play
Neglecting dependency of observations the latter result can be statistically validated on an

Game Mode and Moves
SeqOne SeqAll SimOne SimAll
l r l r l r l r
Prop        
Equal        
Resp        P
       
Table  Proposers behavior summarised
Game Mode and Moves
SeqOne SeqAll SimOne SimAll
L  R  L R L  R  L R L  R  L R L  R  L R
Prop            
Equal              
Resp             
Table  Responders behavior detailed
 Discussion
We designed three mini ultimatum games which vary only in one payo	 vector
following the acceptance of the almost fair o	er In one version an exactly
equal split of the pie was feasible In two other versions the exactly equal split
was replaced by a nearly equal split once slightly favoring the proposer and once
slightly favoring the responder Comparing the equality game with the inequality
games we observed a behavioral discontinuity in the sense that behavior changed
dramatically although the inequality games were generated by only slightly alter
ing a single payo	 vector of the equality game More precisely proposers make
signi cantly more often unfair o	ers when the exactly equal split is not feasible
Responders reject unfair o	ers less often when the almost fair o	er implies a
slight payo	 advantage for the proposer Moreover there is hardly any willing
ness to reject nearly equal splits ie minor inequalities are not annoying enough
to induce conict
In the light of Regularity  an important message of our study is that ex
perimental observations depend crucially on the method of eliciting choices Ex
perimenters have to keep in mind that one possibly has to pay a high price for
gathering more data and economizing on subjects by using the strategy method
aggregate level p          

or confronting participants with more than one game
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Appendix
A Detailed data of modes













Mode SimOne One game simultaneously
Proposer Responder
r  r  r  	   L  L  L  	
l  l  l     R   R   R      L   L   L    
r  r  l     L  L  R   
Mode SeqAll All three games sequentially Prop  Equal  Resp 
Proposer Responder
r  r  r   L   L  L   L  L   L  	
l  l  l    R   L  R   L  R   L   
r  r  l    R   L  L   L  R   L  
l  r  r   R   L  R   L  L   L  
l  r  l   L   L  L   R  L   L  
r  l  l  
Mode SimAll All games simultaneously Prop  Equal  Resp 
B Translated Instructions
Those parts of the instructions being only relevant in the All treatments are in
brackets
Please read the following instructions carefully In case of questions raise your
hand We will answer all questions privately

Welcome to our experiment As you will see in a moment you can earn some
money How much depends on what you will do and on what somebody else with
whom you will be randomly matched will do The rules are quite simple Look
at the following decision trees
Figures of relevant game trees
In all three situations First A decides whether to choose r or l After
A has made his choice B has to decide Depending on As choice B either has
to choose between L and R or between L and R Four cases are
possible
A chooses l B chooses L In this case A receives DM  and B receives
DM  all situations
A chooses l B chooses R In this case both receive nothing all situa
tions
A chooses r B chooses L In this case A receives DM amount according
to game and B DM amount according to game In the All treatments this
sentence was repeated for all situations
A chooses r B chooses R In this case both receive nothing all situa
tions
In case you are A please make your choice between l and r by drawing a
small circle around the letter Do this for all three situations
Next paragraph only for Sim treatments In case you are B please make
your choice between L and R for the case A chooses l and make your
choice between L and R for the case A chooses r Do this by drawing
two six circles indicating your decisions This means that every A has to draw
one three circles and every B has to draw two six circles
Next paragraph only for Seq treatments As decisions sheet will then be
passed to a randomly chosen B Knowing As decision B has to make his choice
ie if A has chosen l B has to choose between L and R and if A has
chosen r B has to choose between L and R As a B do this by drawing
a small circle around the label of your choice Do this for all three situations
Next paragraph only for Sim treatments After having collected all decision
sheets we will pair As and Bs randomly to determine your payo	s
To ensure your anonymity you receive a code number on a separate card
Please write your code number in the appropriate box on your decision sheet and
keep your code card You will receive your payo	 only for showing this card This
procedure ensures your anonymity with respect to us and to the participant you
are matched with
You have role AB

